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NOTE
FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL-A CONFLICT
In the attempt to preserve two basic rights granted by the Consti-
tution of the United States, the freedom of speech and press' and
the guarantee of a fair trial, 2 a conflict has developed between the
Bench and Bar on the one hand and the press and other news media
on the other. The legal profession insists that over-publicity often
tends to undermine the right to a fair trial. On the other hand the
news media, being understandably jealous of their freedom of pub-
lication, are quick to resist suggestions that would tend to limit the
scope of their operations. It is only by a complete understanding of
the basic desires and purposes of each party to the conflict that the
real problem can be discovered. The purpose of this Note is to out-
line the respective interests, examine the present treatment of this
conflict, and attempt to discover how the conflict might be resolved
or at least lessened.
1. "Congress shall make no lawv... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press.... ." U. S. Const. Amend. I.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." U. S. Const. Amend. VI.
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THE NEws ME~Is CAsE
In 'a democratic society, where accurate information is a pre-
requisite to intelligent decision-making by the public, the news
media serve a vital role. Their primary functions are "the dissemina-
tion of news, the editorial guidance of public opinion, and the con-
duct of a commercial business." 3 With its continued existence, the
press soon finds that it has created a duty for itself to keep the public
informed. In fulfilling its role as public disseminator of the news,
the news media realize that:
"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public
should know what goes on in the courts by being told by the
press what happens there, to the end that the public may judge
whether our system of criminal justice is fair and right."4
Public scrutiny of the judicial process serves a two-fold purpose.
It can be a benefit to the public and a benefit to the accused. 5
Familiarity with court procedures can instil in the public a respect
for the law, confidence in judicial remedies, and intelligent acquaint-
ance with the methods of our government. 6 So far as the accused
is concerned, he is safeguarded by the presence of a critical press
and public whose purpose is to keep the judicial tribunals conscien-
tious in the performance of their duties. 7 In general, a public trial
is said to help secure trustworthiness and completeness of testimonyB
Thus the existence of the public and the free press are an im-
portant if not an indispensible element in the concept of a fair trial.
The press is able to bring into the court room those of the public
who could not attend and, through intelligent reporting, educate the
reading public in judicial affairs. This freedom of the fourth estate
to watch over the administration of our judicial system is said to
have been one of the factors that has freed the American system of
justice from the abuses of the Spanish Inquisition, the English
3. See 62 A. B. A. Rep. 851, 855 (1937).
4. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950).
5. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Ibid.
7. "The greatest safety that a defendant has in our courts is the openness
of his trial; the fact that the newspapers send reporters to the court; that they
often unearth evidence which lawyers try to hide or even miss; that judges are
constantly under the kleig lights of their scrutiny." White, Newspaper and
Radio Coverage of Criminal Trials: A Modern Dilemma, 41 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 306, 307 (1950).
8. It is claimed that the presence of the public stimulates in a witness the
"instinctive responsibility to public opinion... (which is] ... ready to scorn
a demonstrated liar" and induces "the fear of exposure of subsequent falsities,"
thereby improving the quality of the testimony. 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834.
Nevertheless, the presence of a large public in the court room might disturb
or intimidate an already frightened witness to the point where his testimony
would be of little value.
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Court of Star Chambers, and the French lettre de cachet.9
What the press and other news media object to are attempts by
the Bench and Bar to curtail free news coverage of judicial activity,
thereby interfering with the performance by the news disseminators
of their duty to the public. One bitter objection was recently put
forth by a past president of the Society of American Newspaper
Editors to a proposed New York law which would curtail the press
from obtaining certain facts pertaining to the issues to be tried prior
to the commencement of a criminal proceeding.10 This law, pro-
posed by the Committee on Civil Rights of the New York State
Bar Association, would place a restriction on attorneys and other
public officials, but not the press, as to what information might be
given out before the time of trial. In his attack on the proposed legis-
lation, the past president stated that ". . . if this [proposed legisla-
tion] had come up 15 years ago, I would guess the author to be
Goebels. . .", and claimed that the committee was attempting to
place a "gag" on the press.1 2 Such is the feeling of some newsmen
when it is suggested that one means of insuring fair trials is to
curtail their free coverage of events leading up to the legal proceed-
ings.
Many members of the press are not as vehement, however.'5
While seeking to avoid censorship of their activities as well as any
legislation which would have the effect of drying up helpful news
sources, they realize the interests that must be protected. The mem-
bers of the press as well as the members of the legal profession are
interested in seeing an accused's right to a fair trial protected.
They have no intention of undermining justice. It is any all-inclusive
rule curtailing their activity and laid down without exceptions that
the news industry objects to and cannot understand. A prohibition
against photography and broadcasting in court rooms similar to
that set out in Canon 35 of the Code of Judicial Ethics is thought to
be such a rule.14
It must not be forgotten that the task of disseminating the news
is a legitimate exercise of free enterprise, kept alive only by the
9. See In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 268-269 (1948). But see Radin, The
Right to a Public Trial, 6 Tem L. Q. 381, 386-387 (1932), who maintains
that the real grievance against the Star Chamber was not its secrecy but the
power of the court and the arbitrary manner in which the Star Chamber
exercised this power.
10. See Fair Trial-Free Press: A Panel Discussion, 26 N. Y. S. Bar
Bull. 202 (1954).
11. Id. at 206.
12. Ibid.
13. For example see White, supra note 7.
14. See Charnley, Should Courtroom Proceedings Be Broadcast?, 11
Fed. Comm. B. J. 64 (1950).
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volume of sales. Such a business should not be curtailed by rules
which have no immediate effect in facilitating a fair trial.
THE BENCH AND BAR's CASE
It is not the desire of the legal profession to restrict arbitrarily
the freedom of the press and other news media, but the courts have a
grave concern over the rights of an accused. Many precautions have
been taken to protect the rights of an accused. Among these is the
right of an accused to a public trial in the federal courts 2 as well
as in the state courts.', But by the term, public trial,
"... it is not meant that every person who sees fit shall in all
cases be permitted to attend criminal trials. . . . The require-
ment of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the
public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly con-
demned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep
his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to
the importance of their functions; and the requirement is fairly
observed if, without partiaaity or favoritism, a reasonable pro-
portion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that
those persons whose presence could be of no service to the ac-
cused, and who would only be drawn thither by a prurient
curiosity, are excluded altogether."' 7
Thus a judge may clear the court room to "secure the administra-
tion of justice and to facilitate the proper conduct of the trial. .. .18
Individuals may also be excluded from the court because of tender
years.'" The fact that the public feature of a trial is primarily for the
benefit of the accused was brought out recently in a New York case
in which members of the press, having been excluded from the court
room during the People's case in a prosecution for conspiracy to
commit acts injurious to public morals, were found not to have a
legally enforceable right to attend the trial .2 Basing their argument
15. U. S. Const. Amend. VI.
16. A secret proceeding in a state court for criminal contempt was held
to violate the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment. In re Oliver, 333
U. S. 257 (1948). Nearly all State Constitutions grant the right of a public
trial to an accused. See, e.g., Minn. Const. Art. I, § 6.
17. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 647 (8th ed. 1927).
18. E.g., Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S. W. 2d 931 (1935). (Thejudge expelled all members of the public from the courtroom for ten minutes
during the testimony of a small girl who was too frightened to testify in a
rape case).
19. "No person under the age of 17 years, not a party to, witness in or
directly interested in a criminal prosecution or trial . . . shall attend or be
present at such trial. . . ." Minn. Stat. § 631.04 (1953).
20. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 281 App. Div. 395, 120 N. Y. S. 2d
174 (1st Dep't 1953).
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on the New York Judiciary Law,21 the United Press Association
claimed that as members of the public they have a free right to
attend all proceedings from which they were not expressly excluded
by the law. The court dismissed the argument by stating that the
direction in the law providing for public trials and free attendance
by all citizens was
".... given to judges concerning how they should conduct their
courts in the interest of parties before the court, and not de-
signed to create causes of action in outsiders to meddle in the
administration of justice between litigants while trials are in
progress. '22
For further protection of the accused, society has set up the
court and jury system as a tribunal to determine the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused on the basis of evidence presented in court.
Many procedural and evidentiary rules have been established to
facilitate the conduct of an impartial and unprejudiced trial. It
would seem an anomaly if such careful measures to preserve this
unbiased atmosphere were being taken by the judiciary while no
attention was being given to the effect that outside influences, such
as newspaper comments, might have on what is going on inside the
court room.23
"The very word 'trial' connotes decisions on the evidence and
arguments properly advanced in open court. Legal trials are not
like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the
radio, and the press."2 4
The problem of prejudice is most acute in jury trials where sen-
sational treatment of a case may tend to prejudice the thinking of
21. N. Y. Judiciary Law § 4. "The sittings of every court within this
state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same except thatin all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape,
assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy, or filiation, the court
may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly
interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses and officers of the court."
22. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 281 App. Div. 395, 404-405, 120
N. Y. S. 2d 174, 184 (1st Dep't 1954). The defendant in the trial from which
the press was excluded later won a new trial on the grounds that such exclu-
sion denied him his statutory right to a public trial. People v. Jelke, 284 App.Div. 211, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (1st Dep't 1954). The Valente case, which had
reserved the question as to whether or not there was a deprivation of the
right to a public trial until such time as the defendant raised the matter on
appeal, was not overruled. While the Jelke case serves notice on New York
trial courts that they should not readily exclude the press or public from trials,
apparently those so removed still do not have legal standing to challenge such
exclusions.
23. One writer stated that a court's ignoring of external prejudicial
factors in the trying of a case would be comparable to a surgeon spending
much time sterilizing his instruments and preparing for a clean operation, and
then ordering the windows thrown open for the dust and dirt to come in just
as he is to make his incision. Rifkind, When the Press Collides with .ustice,
34 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 46, 49 (1950).
24. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 271 (1941).
1955]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the community and even the jury members if objectionable material
finds its way into their hands. In the case of an especially brutal
crime, where the pre-trial publicity has been quite extensive, a
community could be so incensed that a jury might be afraid to
render any other verdict except one of "guilty." If this were the
case, counsel for an accused might have no other choice but to
waive a jury trial and have the case tried before the court. The
problem of jury influence by the press is very serious, because data
not admissible in court because of the rules of evidence will often be
found in news reports. If steps can be taken against attempts to
influence a juror by means of a note handed directly to him,2 5 should
the courts ignore communication with the jurors of a similar nature,
merely because the views of the author are in the form of a printed
column?
A study made of the Hauptman tria 2 6 brought out many of the
abuses by the press which affect an accused's right to a fair trial.
But the report of the Hauptman trial revealed an even more preva-
lent evil of the free press-namely, publications which tend to place
the American judicial system in a disrespected light. During the
Hauptman trial, newspapermen came from all over the world, the
court house was jammed, and there were cameras and sound pro-
jectors in the court roomy7 Newspaper headlines read, "It's a
Sideshow, a jamboree," and "It's a Holiday, a Freak Show.128
In fact the Hauptman trial was made into a judicial circus by the
press and by other instrumentalities of communication.
The evils of a sensationalistic approach to the news have long
been a problem. It was Thomas Jefferson who said:
"I deplore.. . the putrid state into which our newspapers have
passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit
of those who write them. . . . These ordures are rapidly de-
praving the public taste. It is however an evil for which there is
no remedy, for our liberty depends on the freedom of the press,
and that cannot be limited without being lost. 29
Perhaps a certain amount of abuse of the judicial system by a criti-
cal press can be tolerated. But when the free comment goes so far
as to jeopardize an accused's right to a fair trial, freedom of the
press must be limited.
25. See Ex parte Smith, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 179, 49 S. W. 396 (1899).
26. A report of the special committee appointed by the American Bar
Association to study the Hauptman trial appears in Hallam, Some Object
Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 453, 477 (1940).
27. See id. at 454-461. Both cameras and sound pictures were forbidden
from the courtroom during the trial, but the order was surreptitiously violated
many times. Id. at 461.
28. Id. at 460.
29. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 270 n. 16 (1941).
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PRESENT POWERS OF THE AmERICAN COURTS
In America free publication has been curtailed in the interest of
fair trials by the use of the contempt powers of the federal and
state courts.30 An early statute gave the federal courts very broad
powers to punish summarily for contempt at their own discretion.,,
This power was later limited to "misbehavior in its [the court's]
presence" or "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice."3 2 This statute was further limited in interpretation by a
decision holding "near" to be a geographical limitation so that
"misbehavior," to be construed as contempt, must occur in the
vicinity of the court. 83
There are also two federal criminal provisions which deal with
punishment for the obstruction of justice by means of communica-
tion. One punishes
"Whoever corruptly . . . or by any threatening letter of com-
munication, endeavors to influence or intimidate, or impede...
any grand or petit juror ... in the discharge of his duty. . . or
... influences, or impedes ... the due administration of jus-
tice. . ...34
The other punishes
"Whoever attempts to influence . . . any grand or petit juror
•.. by writing or sending to him any written communication in
relation to such matter [pending before him] ....
Neither one of these sections, however, has been used to punish
the news media for publications affecting a pending case.
Certain Constitutional limitations have arisen on the judicial
power to hold publications to be contemptuous, and to punish ac-
cordingly. During the pendency of a probation matter a Los Angeles
newspaper published an editorial entitled "Probation for Gorillas,"
which stated that the judge who was to decide the probation matter
would make a serious mistake if he granted probation to the parties
concerned. The California Supreme Court found the editorial to
show disrespect for the judiciary, to have a reasonable tendency to
influence the proceedings and to interfere with the proper adminis-
tration of justice.38 In still another California case where litigation
was not at an end, a labor leader was held in contempt for causing
30. For a critical analysis of the history of the use of these powers see
Deutsch, Liberty of Expressiom and Contempt of Court, 27 Minn. L. Rev.
296 (1943).
31. 1 Stat. 83 (1789).
32. 18 U. S. C. § 401 (1952).
33. Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 (1941).
34. IS U. S. C. § 1503 (1952).
35. 18 U. S. C. § 1504 (1952).
36. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 98 P. 2d 1029
(1940).
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the publication of a telegram, the contents of which criticized the
decision of a court in a labor dispute, and menacingly predicted that
attempted enforcement of the decision would result in widespread
labor strifeY7
However in 1941 on appeals to the Supreme Court of the
United States it was held that the California court could not punish
for contempt either the newspaper or the labor leader.3 8 In so hold-
ing, the Court for the first time applied the "clear and present
danger" rule to the contempt powers of the states. The Supreme
Court rejected the California test that the publications, to be con-
temptuous, need only have a reasonable or inherent tendency to
obstruct justice.39 The working principle that the court sought to
establish in this case was that the "substantive evil must be ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished."' Justice Frankfurter criticized this
distinction between "clear and present danger" and "reasonable
tendency" as too fine a point on which to alter California's policy
in protecting its own judicial system. 41
Two other Supreme Court cases have strengthened the "clear
and present danger" limitation on the imposition of sanctions for
contemptuous publications. The first arose out of a conviction in
a Florida court4 2 of a newspaper and its editor for editorial and
cartoon criticism which implied that a certain judge, out of sinister
motives, was using procedural technicalities to slow down the
prosecution of certain crimes in the state. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction by applying the clear and
present danger rule, finding that the potentiality that evil conse-
quences would flow from the newspaper commentary was not very
likely. 3 The other decision44 was the reversal of a contempt con-
viction in a Texas court of a reporter for delivering a blistering
editorial attack on a lay judge, who had twice refused to accept a
jury verdict until finally the jury brought in a verdict in compliance
with his instructions.4 5 At the time of the editorial the case was up
on motion for a new trial.
37. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P. 2d 983 (1939).
38. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
39. Id. at 272-273.
40. Id. at 263.
41. See id. at 295-297 (dissenting opinion).
42. Pennekamp v. State, 156 Fla. 227, 22 So. 2d 875 (1945).
43. Pennekamp v. Florida, 323 U. S. 331 (1946).
44. Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947).
45. See id. at 375. The editorial labeled the judge's conduct at the trial
as "high handed" and a "travesty on justice," deploring the fact that the judge
was a layman and not a "competen attorney."
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All of the three above cases involved either an attack on the
court or a prejudicial statement by the press where only a judge
was sitting. There has been no Supreme Court of the United States
decision dealing with prejudicial publication affecting a jury case.
Few cases of this nature would ever come up before the Supreme
Court simply because after the community-poisoning publications
have been made, an attorney often dares not risk a jury trial for
his client, but instead chooses trial before the court. Such a deci-
sion to waive a jury trial because of prejudice was made by counsel
in a Baltimore murder case. After the community had become en-
raged over the brutal slayings of two young girls, a Baltimore
radio announcer went on the air and stated that a man had been
apprehended and charged with murder, after giving a complete
confession. The announcer went on to tell about the man's long
criminal record. The Criminal Court of Baltimore fined the broad-
caster for contempt, but the Maryland Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, saying that notwithstanding the broadcast, there was no
provable "clear and present danger" that the defendant's rights to a
fair trial had been jeopardized. 46 The court found no direct evi-
dence of prejudice in the community and considered the attorney's
testimony that he felt the broadcast precluded him from getting an
impartial jury to be "only conclusions" and "not statements of
fact." 47 The Supreme Court of the United States refused to grant
certiorari.
PRESENT POWERS OF THE ENGLISH COURTS
It has been said that "[o]ne of the objects of the Revolution was
to get rid of the English Common Law on liberty of speech and of
the press.14 8 Nevertheless, no study of free press and fair trial
would be complete without mention of the presently existing Eng-
lish views on the subject, not only for comparative purposes, but
perhaps with the idea that some of their well-used concepts might
aid us in solving our dilemma.
The English judicial system is notably more strict than the
American system in dealing with published comments on pending
litigation. We have seen that American courts have established the
test that a publication to be contemptuous must be one which poses
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil of extreme serious-
46. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A. 2d 497(1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 912 (1950).
47. Id. at 330, 67 A. 2d at 511.
48. Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 Publications
Amer. Sociol. Soc., 67, 76 (1914).
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ness and of an extremely high degree of imminence. 9 The English
on the other hand label as contemptuous any publication "reason-
ably calculated" to interfere with the administration of justice, and
no actual interference need be shown." Also, "Any act done or
writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court
into contempt or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court."'"
These tests leave ample room for judicial construction. In cases
where the publication is not cbviously contemptuous, or intention-
ally calculated to obstruct justice, a court need only find that a
publication might conceivably prejudice a pending trial.5 2 In order
for a court to ascertain this,
".... the circumstances of the case must be taken into account.
The nature of the proceedings which were pending, the conduct
of the parties, the time, the manner and locality of the publica-
tion in relation to the time, the mode, and the locality of the
trial are all to be considered. . .."53
This tight English restriction on the press takes effect as soon
as the first legal action is taken on a case. 54 During the trial the
English take great care that the tribunal delivers a verdict which
has been reached only by deliberation on the evidence given in court
by the parties.5 5 Publications are punishable which damagingly
allude to potentially admissible evidence,56 or which contain preju-
dicial, inadmissible evidence,17 or which consist of comments on
the merits of the case "planted" by counsel.58
After the litigation is over any comment on the proceedings is
permitted. There is one seldom-invoked limitation, however, to this
post-trial comment found in tile English system-namely, comments
involving "scurrilous abuse" of the judiciary in connection with the
conduct of the case. 59 This iurther English power to punish for
contempt does not mean that the judge and courts are not open to
criticism, but it does mean that the criticism must be reasonable.
49. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
50. See Ludwig, Journalism and Jistice in Criminal Law, 28 St. John's
L. Rev. 197, 206 (1954).
51. Queen v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q. B. 36, 40.
52. See Rex v. Editor of Daily Mail, 44 T. L. R. 303, 306 (K.B. 1928).
53. Ibid.
54. King v. Parke, [1903] 2 K. B. 432; Rex v. Clarke, 103 L. T. 636
(K.B. 1910). Issuance of a warrant is said to be the first legal action in a
criminal proceeding.
55. See Daw v. Eley, L. R. 7 Eq. 49, 59 (1868).
56. Rex v. Clarke, 103 L. T. 636 (K.B. 1910).
57. King v. Tibbits and Windust, [1902] 1 K. B. 77.
58. Daw v. Eley, L. R. 7 Ec. 49 (1868).
59. Queen v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q. B. 36.
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RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
The real problem arises in an attempt to resolve the conflict
that has arisen out of the practical application of the two Consti-
tutional freedoms. One cynical observation has been that "[i] ts reso-
lution is easy if one interest may be carefully considered and the
other happily ignored."'60 But in spite of this outlook perhaps a
workable solution can be reached by considering both sides.
The judicial system has the power to take certain procedural
steps by which the prejudicial affect of comments already published
might be avoided. One of these methods is a change of venue before
the jury has been impaneled. This remedy, however, is not as
effective today as it might have been in the past due to the existence
of widespread radio, television, and newspaper coverage. Thus
courts have refused to grant change of venue in well-publicized
cases on the ground that there is no guarantee that the site to which
the trial may be moved would not be as biased as the original com-
munity.6 , Counsel for an accused may also have a difficult time
proving that an impartial jury could not be obtained; for the mere
fact that newspapers have given widespread publicity to the forth-
coming trial is not necessarily regarded as sufficient to establish
that a fair trial could not be had in that community.6 2 A decision in
this vein by the courts does not take into account the underlying
prejudice that might be present in jury members drawn from the
community most intimately involved. Therefore it seems that
changes of venue should be liberally granted where an attorney
feels that his client might have a better chance of a fair trial in
another community, so long as the opposing party is not prejudiced
by the change.
Another method of minimizing the damaging effects of pre-trial
publications is by a request for a continuance until the publicity has
died down.63 If the prejudicial material finds its way into the hands
of the jury after a trial is in progress, the members might be dis-
charged and a continuance granted until another jury can be im-
paneled.04 But it must be borne in mind that a continuance, besides
not being able to insure that a fair trial will take place, involves
the usual risks attendant to a postponement of trial; for during the
60. Ludwig, supra note 50, at 202.
61. E.g., Shockley v. United States, 166 F. 2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U. S. 850 (1948).
62. Morgan v. State, 84 S. E. 2d 365 (Ga. 1954).
63. Delaney v. United States, 199 F. 2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) (Denial of
a defendant's motion for a continuance for a reasonable time until the
prejudical effect of publications wore off was reversible error).
64. In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849 (9th Cir. 1917).
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lapse of time certain key witnesses might die or forget much of the
detailed information that would lead to a conviction or acquittal. 6
Two other means could be used by the courts in avoiding already
published material which might be prejudicial--cautioning jurors
not to read the papers or listen to the radio and locking the jurors
up during the trial. The first of these methods might prove in-
effectual 8 while the second would be quite undesirable.
In addition to finding means to avoid the prejudicial effect of
material already published, attempts should be made to prevent the
publication of such material 5n the first instance. Some sort of
voluntary agreement restricting publications would appear to be
the most desirable means of resolving the conflict since a statutory
attempt at resolution not only might breed animosity between the
news industry and the legal profession, but also might be in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. This type of agreement between the
press and Bench and Bar has been recently prepared by a Com-
mittee of the New York County Lawyers Association in the form
of a code of ethics.8 7 The major difficulty with a code of ethics is
that it might prove ineffectual. Because of the presence of competi-
tion for news in the United States, to be workable the code would
have to be subscribed to by all the major news media in the country.
And even then, adherence to the code might be doubtful without
some coercive threat of legal action for its breach.
A restriction on the source of the prejudicial material, as op-
posed to one on the news media, would not run afoul of the First
Amendment. This could be achieved by the simple expedient of
having prosecutors and lawyers keeping information to themselves
when within earshot of reporters. The American Bar Association
has established such a restriction on publicity through Canon 20
of the Code of Legal Ethics.68 Canon 20 attempts to curtail publica-
65. See Forer, A Free Press and a Fair Trial, 39 A. B. A. J. 800, 845
(1953).
66. "To prevent that man [the juror] from reading papers will result
in his death from frustration. You might just as well ask Katherine Hepburn
not to read her press notices following an opening night." Rifkind, supra
note 23, at 51.
67. A text of the proposed code appears in an article by Otterbourg, Fair
Trial and Free Press: A Subject Vital to the Existence of Democracy, 39
A. B. A. J. 978, 980 (1953).
68. Canon 20: "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or
anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and other-
wise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be
condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a state-
ment to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An cx parte
reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and
papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any
cx parte statement."
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tions of possibly prejudicial material by condemning lawyers' com-
ments on pending litigation. Amendment of this canon has been
recommended so as to make it more strict and effective. 9 In a
recent report of the Committee on Civil Rights of the New York
Bar Association, this attempted curtailment of'prejudicial publica-
tions by Canon 20 was sought to be strengthened and broadened by
proposed legislation."° This legislation would make it unlawful for
a prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, or any other person having
an official connection with the case from disclosing such things as
evidence allegedly existing against the accused, statements or ad-
missions made by him, or other matter pertaining to the trial. Even
without mandatory legislation one district attorney's office has re-
fused to release statements or confessions allegedly made by an
accused.71 A practice of similar nature throughout the country
would be highly commendable.
Canon 35 of the Code of Judicial Ethics,7 2 on the other hand,
places the restriction on the news media by in effect prohibiting
-broadcasts and photography in the courtroom during sessions of
the court. Such a restriction might be too severe in the light of
modern technical advances in the field.7 3 Presently there are studies
going on leading to the revision of this canon.74
A court rule imposing silence on lawyers only and not on the
press, similar in effect to the legislative proposal of the New York
State Bar Association Committee; has been suggested" and might
prove quite effective. On the other hand, court rules which attempt
to hold the press in contempt for prejudicial publications must be
69. See Fair Trial-Free Press: A Panel Discussion, 26 N. Y. S. Bar
Bull. 202, 225 (1954).
70. See 77 N. Y. S. Bar Ass'n Rep. 304-308 (1954).
71. See Fair Trial-Free Press: A Panel Discussion, 26 N. Y. S. Bar
Bull. 202, 220 (1954).
72. Canon 35: "Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting
dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during
sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or
televising of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential
dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade
the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the
public and should not be permitted."
73. For a discussion of the news media's point of view as to why more
liberal access to courtrooms should be given broadcasters, see Charnley,
supra note 14.
74. See the Report of the Special Decorum in Courts Committee of the
Minnesota State Bar Association, 11 Bench & Bar 49 (1954). The American
Bar Association has taken steps to set up a bar-press conference committee
to consider the controversy which has developed over Canon 35. See 2 Am. Bar
Coordinator 24 (Dec. 15, 1954).
75. See note 70 supra.
76. See Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press: A New Look in 1954, 40
A. B. A. J. 838, 913 (1954).
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carefully drawn otherwise they might be of no effect due to the
"clear and present" danger rule of the United States Supreme
Court.77
Before attempting to restrict the activities of the press, the legal
profession should put its own house in order by disciplining its
members either by court rules, a more effective code of ethics or
even by legislation. Self-discipline would probably solve a great
part of the problem of preserving a fair trial. After this is done the
members of the press, bench and bar could attempt to formulate
together workable standards under which each might effectively
operate in conscientious fulfillment of their duties.
77. See Busser, Free Press and Fair Trial, 27 Temp. L. Q. 178, 190(1953). A set of court rules defining contempt by publication were in effect
nullified by the Maryland Supreme Court's application of the "clear and
present danger" rule. See Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 193 Md. 300, 67 A. 2d
487 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 912 (1950).
